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Abstract
In the digital age, the crisis of journalism has been exacerbated by antagonistic actors infiltrating the journalistic system
without adhering to its norms or logic. Journalism itself has been ill-prepared to respond to this challenge, but journalism
theory and research have also had trouble in grasping these phenomena. It is thus the aim of this article to propose a theo-
retical perspective on a specific set of antagonists characterized by its paradoxical nature. It is ‘the excluded third, included’
as described by Serres, the parasite that is both part of the system and its antagonist. From the perspective of systems
theory, the parasite is a subsystem that threatens the integrity of the primary system. Thus, the parasite is defined by the
relations that describe its position, its behaviour towards the host system. Due to these peculiarities—this contradiction,
this vagueness—it evades a classical bivalent logic. This may be one reason why the paradoxical nature of the antagonist
from within, the ‘uninvited dinner guest,’ has not been described as such until now. The parasitic practices follow the logic
of the hacker: He is the digital manifestation of Serres’ parasite. Accordingly, parasitic strategies can be described as news
hacks whose attack vectors target a system’s weak points with the help of specific strategies. In doing so, they not only
change the system output but also compromise its values and exploit its resources.
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1. Introduction
From a journalistic perspective, the digital age can
be described as a phase of differentiation and
de-differentiation (Wang, 2020). The clash of old and
new media logics in the hybrid media system (Chadwick,
2017) creates a need to engage in boundary work
(Carlson& Lewis, 2019). In our participatorymediaworld,
these processes of translation and synchronization do
not take place exclusively within the journalistic system.
Its blurred, fluid, and permeable boundaries also allow
third parties to make an impact without having to sub-
ject to system norms. This is the type of actor this article
is about—according to Serres, it is “the excluded third,
included” (Serres, 2007, p. 76), or also: the parasite.
These actors are distinguished from other antagonis-
tic actors by four particular characteristics: (1) They do
not act from outside, they do not try to combat jour-
nalists through physical violence or oppression, such as
censorship—they act from within; (2) by doing so uni-
laterally they avail themselves of journalistic resources;
(3) they take advantage of the freedoms of a democratic
public in pursuit of their strategic goals, compromising
the very values on which these freedoms are based; and
(4) they are an inherent part of the system (while at
the same time being alien to the system) and therefore
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cannot be eliminated without restricting the freedoms
(or values) of the system itself.
In recent years, central terms have been coined and
frameworks established, which now allow us to ana-
lytically describe and classify these actors and their
strategies: The term ‘information disorder’ (Wardle &
Derakhshan, 2017), for example, focuses on various
forms of false information and its effects in the hybrid
media system (see also Bayer et al., 2019); ‘dark partici-
pation’ (Quandt, 2018) denotes the destructive potential
inherent in every participatory technology (see also ‘data
craft,’ Acker, 2018; or ‘digital influence machine,’ Nadler,
Crain, & Donovan, 2018; or ‘alternative influence,’ Lewis,
2018); ‘source hacking’ (Donovan & Friedberg, 2019)
refers to strategies to manipulate digital journalism (see
also Phillips, 2018). Despite this great wealth of differ-
ent concepts, we still lack models to describe these rela-
tionships on a theoretical level. To close this gap, we
draw on The Parasite, a work by French philosopher
Michel Serres (2007). In addition to the biological mean-
ing of the term parasite as an organism living off a host
animal (p. 50), Serres (2007) uses an inductive-iterative
approach to explore various linguistic levels of mean-
ing of the term ‘parasite’—as an uninvited house guest
(p. 50) or as disruptive noise (p. 47), called a ‘signal par-
asite’ in French. Serres’ analyses usually depart from an
analogy (for example, a parable, see Section 2.2) and are
then projected onto a more general context. Through
this abstraction, he is able to overcome the classical biva-
lent logic, introducing the parasite as an inevitable third
party. Serres’ trivalent logic has also been incorporated
by Luhmann into his systems theory (Luhmann, 2008).
Here the parasite is the actor that undermines the func-
tional differentiation of social systems and weakens the
boundaries to their environments (Leanza, 2014).
As we study the dynamics of the digital world, the
datafication of human behaviour (Couldry & Yu, 2018),
the platformisation of the web ecosystem (Nieborg &
Poell, 2018), and hacking as “digital parasitism” (Aradau,
Blanke, & Greenway, 2019, p. 2548), it becomes clear
how relevant and on-point Serres’ and Luhmann’s the-
oretical foundations are today. They allow us to clas-
sify the above-mentioned sample cases of antagonistic
behaviour. For instance, source hacking practices such
as “keyword squatting” (Donovan & Friedberg, 2019,
p. 37) or “evidence collages” (Donovan & Friedberg,
2019, p. 26) can be described as parasitic news hacks
that operate on an attack vector (see Section 4.3),
in which they apply strategies, exploit vulnerabilities,
manipulate output, compromise values, and appropri-
ate resources.
Themodel of the news hack thus not only defines the
constellation of actors in relation to journalism but also
describes the process of a one-way transfer of resources
and the gradual undermining of the system’s values.
It thus associates these parasitic practices with findings
on the erosion of trust in the media (Newman, Fletcher,
Schulz, Andı, & Nielsen, 2020, p. 14) or the normaliza-
tion of right-wing rhetoric in the mainstream (Larson &
McHendry, 2019, p. 518).
2. Framework: Theory of Parasites
2.1. Paradoxes
In order to underscore the desideratum of a new ter-
minology for antagonistic actors, we will take up the
figure of the “rogue actor” (Entman & Usher, 2018,
pp. 302–303), a notion that suffers from an unre-
solved theoretical contradiction: According to Entman
and Usher (2018), rogue actors violate norms while act-
ing outside of them—they are actors who attack journal-
ism from outside. At the same time, they use the codes
of the system, for example, by spreading “entirely base-
less false information formatted like traditional news”
(Entman & Usher, 2018, p. 303). Their success is there-
fore also based on the fact that they do not act exclu-
sively outside the norms, but rather partially harness
themwhenever it suits their need. We are facing the log-
ical problem of the ‘excluded third,’ which Serres (2007)
describes as follows: “Which is the third part? Or who
or what is the third, in this logic of the trenchant deci-
sion? Is the third excluded or not? Here we have a triva-
lent logic where we expected only a bivalent one” (p. 78).
In the concept of ‘dark participation,’ this trivalence
resonates as “negative, selfish or even deeply sinister
contributions” (Quandt, 2018, p. 40) to the news-making
process. It describes the alien intruder that negates the
systemic process, in Serres’ words: “The dark side of the
system” (Serres, 2007, p. 61). The present study takes up
Quandt’s concept and adds a relational dimension to it.
By describing actors as ‘parasitic,’ we do not attribute an
ontological quality, but rather assign a relational position
to antagonistic actors (Leanza, 2014, p. 37) within the
journalistic system.
2.2. Analogies
The meaning and functioning of a parasitic element is
best described via relationships, as Serres shows in his
powerful analogies. In his rat parable, he draws on a tradi-
tional fairy tale to describe a chain of parasitic constella-
tions (Serres, 2007, pp. 47–65). In keepingwith the literal
meaning of the Greek word parasite, which refers to an
organism that feeds on another (from pará, ‘beside,’ and
sitos, ‘food’), the parable is about a city ratwho is hosting
his visiting cousin, a country rat, at a meal under his land-
lord’s table. Themetaphor of the uninvited dinner guests
describes the transfer of resources, not only of food
but also of social capital—the embarrassment of the rat-
infested landlord contrasts with the country rat’s admira-
tion of his sophisticated cousin. On the other hand, the
parable illustrates the reflexive mechanism (i.e., a mech-
anism that applies to itself, Luhmann, 1970) of a parasitic
relationship: One parasite opens the door to the next by
creating access.
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In his systems theory, Niklas Luhmann specifically ref-
erences the information-theoretical elements of Serres’
concept of parasites. Like Serres, albeit in a less abstract
way, he uses a parable to illustrate his concept of a para-
sitic subsystem, which is based on Serres. This is how he
describes the commercialization of art:
The opportunity to sell becomes a seduction, quickly
attracting parasites who take advantage of this prob-
lematic relationship between art and the market,
offering advice and mediation services: Please don’t
make the artwork too large; yes, make it original,
because in the language of the market, originality
means scarcity, but don’t be too eccentric in your exe-
cution; perhaps it would be best if you ‘redescribed’
previous art styles, quote them, parody them, break
common boundaries, but make sure the market can
still recognize it and relate it to existing art. (Luhmann,
2008, p. 389, authors’ translation)
2.3. Position
The parasite can be described as a subsystem, an inter-
mediary that mediates between the inside and the out-
side of the system. Its actions are paradoxical in that
it “confirms and rejects the operational closure of its
host system” (Leanza, 2014, p. 28). Serres describes it
as a “semiconductor” (Serres, 2007, p. 341), its rela-
tionships are “one-way streets” (Serres, 2007, p. 106).
To this end, the parasite positions itself “in themost prof-
itable positions, at the intersection of relations” (Serres,
2007, p. 107)—like highwaymen at trade route junc-
tions. Parasites thus also highlight the fault lines of
existing orders, their vulnerabilities: “The places where
you can shake up a system” (Schmitt, 2011, p. 45,
authors’ translation).
2.4. Relation
The interaction between the embedded parasite and the
system can be described by two relations. The first one
simply is the parasite’s draining of resources without pro-
viding any service in return (Serres, 2007, p. 59). This rela-
tion of imbalance inevitably leads to the destruction—
of both the host and the parasite that only exists in
relation to it. The second relation is less one-sided—it
describes how the presence of the parasite affects the
system. According to Serres, a parasite is also the “sim-
plest and most general operator on the variability of sys-
tems” (Serres, 2007, p. 324). If we imagine the system as
a network, a parasitic node “disidentifies from the net-
work but continues to be appended to it” (Mejias, 2010,
p. 615). These nodes introducenoise, interferingwith the
network “while forcing it to adjust to [their] presence”
(Mejias, 2010, p. 615). For Serres, the parasite is, there-
fore, a disruption “that changes the order, and thus its
meaning” (Serres, 2007, p. 313). We call this interdepen-
dence the ‘compromising relation.’
2.5. Reflection
Lastly, the paradox of the parasite is also reflected in the
fact that it creates something new. By acting in a differ-
ent mode of relationality: “The parasite invents some-
thing new….He establishes an unjust pact; relative to the
old type of balance, he builds a new one” (Serres, 2007,
p. 95). The primary parasite thus enables the next para-
site to position itself in a similar relation to the system:
“Parasitic orders are parasite-enabling orders” (Leanza,
2014, p. 37, authors’ translation). The reflexive mecha-
nism of the parasite manifests itself as a chain.
In summary, a parasitic element is characterized by
four points: (1) The parasite positions itself as an inter-
mediary at system boundaries, more precisely, at exist-
ing fault lines. Its interdependence with the system can
be described by two relations, which we call (2) a rela-
tion of imbalance and (3) a relation of compromise. (4) Its
mechanism is reflexive, i.e., it acts as a catalyst for other
similar parasitic relations.
3. Parasites of Journalism: A Relational Approach
3.1. The Eufunctional Relation
Serres’ statement about parasites, in general, has always
applied to the media system as well: “Real produc-
tion is undoubtedly rare, for it attracts parasites that
immediately make it something common and banal.
Real production is unexpected and improbable; it over-
flows with information and is always immediately par-
asited” (Serres, 2007, p. 49). The interdependence
between media is therefore always fraught with imbal-
ance. In pure newspaper markets, this tendency towards
parasitic mimicry used to be compensated for by the
value of topicality—information loses its value over time
and an information parasite who steals from the printing
press would always face a certain time delay. However,
the more this time lag was reduced, the more each
wave of media innovation was accompanied by clam-
ouring voices accusing the newcomer of parasitically
profiting from the original production, with those who
were once considered parasites later accusing the next
crop of parasites of exploiting their one-sided advan-
tage: Representatives of the printing press successively
denounced telegraph companies and their ticker ser-
vices (Kielbowicz, 2015, p. 27), then the radio (Patnode,
2011, p. 87), and later television (Davies, 1998, p. 25), as
parasitic media.
These waves aptly illustrate the phenomenon of dif-
ferentiation and de-differentiation of systems triggered
by parasitic disruption. The evolution of the media ecol-
ogy’s complexities can be described as a re-calibration of
system boundaries and a constant re-definition of what
is ‘inside’ and what is ‘outside’ (see ‘boundary work’ of
Carlson & Lewis, 2019).
It becomes clear that the system is capable of inclu-
sion up to a certain point—that every differentiation
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is accompanied by a parasitic stage of imbalance that
lasts until a new equilibrium is established. This inclusion,
however, presupposes that the host and parasite have
certain structural similarities. In this context, Schneider
distinguishes between parasites “that latch on to the
reproductive process of a functional system in either a
eufunctional or a dysfunctional way” (Schneider, 2014,
p. 100, authors’ translation). While eufunctional para-
sites push into the existing order, dysfunctional parasites
don’t strive for inclusion, but rather profit from their
intermediate status.
3.2. The Dysfunctional Relation
The classical dysfunctional parasite, similar to Luhmann’s
example of the art market, is the actor that commod-
ifies communication—for example through advertising
or public relations. Here too, there is a transfer of
resources: As McAllister (1996) writes, ads “leech cred-
ibility, like a parasite” (p. 140)—he further describes
the one-sidedness of the relation as a promotional con-
tamination of the host. The parasitic logic of adver-
tising thus constantly demands new hosts providing
ever new, fresh resources. The current stage of this
escalation consists of para-journalistic forms that profit
from a steady de-differentiation of journalistic system
boundaries. Schauster, Ferrucci, and Neill (2016, p. 1416)
emphasize that trust in journalism and its credibility
suffer particularly from these new forms of advertising
(e.g., Native Advertising or Brand Journalism).
The decisive difference between eu- and dysfunc-
tional parasitism is therefore that the latter functions
within the system without being fully integrated into it;
it follows a logic that is foreign to the system, implanting
this logic into the system in the form of noise, thus forc-
ing it to adapt. This not only leads to a loss of resources
but also to its values being compromised.
Similarly, we can locate other forms of persua-
sive communication in a dysfunctional relationship to
these values and their vehicles. For instance, the often-
observed paradoxical relationship between populism
and journalism—Haller and Holt speak of “paradoxical
populism” (Haller & Holt, 2018, p. 1665)—also fits the
inherently paradoxical notion of the parasite. In fact,
populism has repeatedly been described as a parasite
of democratic values (Fournier, 2019; Urbinati, 2014).
Fournier (2019) also points out its paradoxical nature
when he writes that populism is “inherent to the fea-
tures of constitutional democracy” (p. 381) while at the
same time pursuing the “objective to destroy the same
constitutional system” (p. 364). Urbinati (2014) stresses
that once populism attains its goal of dominating a demo-
cratic state, “it can modify its figure radically” (p. 135).
This mechanism of destructive modification from within
is what we mean by the ‘compromising relation.’ Bayer
et al. (2019) describe this process with the help of the
populist method of strategic disinformation:
False information in itself (if it does not violate others’
reputation, for example) enjoys the protection of free-
dom of expression, but when the whole environment
of public discourse becomes occupied and dominated
by falsehood, it frustrates the primary purpose of free-
dom of expression. (Bayer et al., 2019, p. 79)
The parasite thus uses the freedoms of the system to
compromise the values from which these very freedoms
are derived. The strategy of compromising becomes par-
ticularly clear in the example of the “lying demagogue”
(Hahl, Kim, & Zuckerman Sivan, 2018, p. 1), who violates
various norms (in particular, truthfulness) so obviously
that the establishment is compelled to distance itself
from this actor: “But this very need by the establishment
to distance itself from the lying demagogue lends credi-
bility to his claim to be an authentic champion for those
who feel disenfranchised by that establishment” (Hahl
et al., 2018, p. 8). As a consequence, anyone who abides
by the norms, who is not ostracized by the establishment
as a pariah, appears “less obviously committed to chal-
lenging it” (Hahl et al., 2018, p. 8). This also, and primar-
ily, concerns the authority of journalistic actors who act
as watchdogs within the norms of a competitive democ-
racy (Strömbäck, 2005, p. 332).
This pattern can be applied to various strategies
employed by antagonistic actors. For example, the strat-
egy of “leak forgery” (i.e., a politically instrumentalized
data breach; see Donovan & Friedberg, 2019, p. 18) is
parasitic to the value of anonymity and the journalistic
freedom of source protection. The strategy of “pseudo-
science” (Hartzell, 2018, p. 17), i.e., camouflaging strate-
gic information as a study, etc., is parasitic to the delib-
erative value of rationality. The value of representation
is compromised by dark participation, by “sock puppets”
or “deep cover” strategies (Acker, 2018, p. 14). The free-
dom of identity and self-development is undermined by
‘hate spins’ (George, 2016), the value of political agonism
(Mouffe, 2000) is undermined by “strategic controversy”
(Lewis, 2018, p. 31), etc.
It remains unclear, however, what changes to
the journalistic system enabled these parasitic chains.
As was the case with earlier disruptions, the decisive
impulse for differentiation is technological innovation.
In contrast to earlier differentiation waves, however, this
one has spawned an actor who opens the system bound-
aries to the outside, positioning itself as an intermediary
on the system boundaries: the platform.
4. Parasites of the Digital Realm
The relationship between journalism and the major
information intermediaries (Helberger, Kleinen-von
Königslöw, & van der Noll, 2015)—i.e., the platforms
Google, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, etc.—
can be described as a process of differentiation and
mutual dependence, attraction, and repulsion, aptly cul-
minating in the paradoxical term ‘frenemies’ (Bell, 2015),
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which means the same thing as Serres’ notion of the
‘included third.’ In fact, in a relatively short period of
time, platform companies managed to create a situa-
tion where the direction of the parasitic relation is not
always evident. The example of the platforms makes it
all too clear that this relation is a matter of perspective:
In the polygon between user, platform, content provider,
advertiser, etc., anyone can be host or parasite. In fact,
the platform completely dissolves the bivalent distinc-
tion between parasite and host.
In the digital sphere, “life-processes must be con-
verted into streams of data inputs for computer-based
processing” (Couldry & Yu, 2018, p. 4473). The para-
sitic medium—a by-product of the actual interaction—
materializes in this process of datafication. Nowhere
is this more obvious than in the digital world, where
any instance of communication opens a door to para-
sitic third-party use—datafication is a “legitimate means
to access…people’s behavior” (Van Dijck, 2014, p. 198,
emphasis in the original). In a second logical step, the par-
asite itself acts as host, enabling and catalysing the very
type of interaction whose secondary product it desires—
to use another one of Serres’ analogies (2007, p. 160):
The “farmer parasites the fauna.” In the digital world, this
evolution of a parasitic logic is described as platformisa-
tion: “The penetration of economic, governmental, and
infrastructural extensions of digital platforms into the
web and app ecosystems, fundamentally affecting the
operations of the cultural industries” (Nieborg & Poell,
2018, p. 4276, emphasis in the original). The parasite
becomes an infrastructure in its own right, striving for a
monopoly and exponentially increasing its influence.
Assuming the perspective of journalism, we quickly
grasp the extent of the parasitic behaviour of the actor
‘platform’ towards the system. The relation of imbalance
is most clearly reflected in the “parasitic relationship to
news production” (Siapera, 2013, p. 17), along with a
radical redistribution of advertising revenues in favour
of digital platforms (Bell & Owen, 2017). They combine
and scale up the above-described logics of advertising
communication and competing media. At the same time,
they leverage their position as a parasitic host to disrup-
tively de- and recode system norms. For the Facebook
algorithm, Caplan and Boyd (2018) describe this compro-
mising effect as an isomorphism. They observed: “How
algorithms structure disparate businesses and aims into
an organizational field, leading them to change their
goals and adopt new practices” (Caplan & Boyd, 2018,
p. 2). In the tradition of isomorphism and bureaucracy
research, algorithms are therefore to be considered an
“extension of bureaucratic tools such as forms” (Caplan&
Boyd, 2018, p. 3). Similarly, Serres describes the bureau-
cratic power “to edit the laws and to withdraw knowl-
edge from the greatest number” (Serres, 2007, p. 98).
This particular “theft of information” (Serres, 2007, p. 97)
is also characteristic of the platforms’ algorithms—they
act as unproclaimed laws without having to be transpar-
ent. For journalism, this means that “by defining and re-
defining the concept of relevance or ‘value’ of informa-
tion and news media, Facebook increasingly writes the
rules, or code, that defines which content succeeds or
fails” (Caplan & Boyd, 2018, p. 5).
4.1. Parasitic Infrastructure
But platforms are not the only parasites feeding on
journalism. Due to the reflexive nature of parasitism
described above, they also function as “opportunity
structures” (Ernst, Esser, Blassnig, & Engesser, 2019,
p. 170) for other actors to act co-parasitically along-
side. They form a powerful sub-system that opens the
boundaries of the journalistic system to various forms
of attackers who use the platform logic as a para-
sitic infrastructure.
Bayer et al. (2019) note that “the interests of the
technology providers (online platforms, social networks,
and digital advertisers) and the actors behind [the] dis-
information campaign[s] are to some extent aligned” (p.
31). Both seek the users’ attention, yet rather than com-
peting for this resource, they support each other sym-
biotically: The actors behind disinformation campaigns
have a “full suite of services” (Bayer et al., 2019, p. 32)
at their disposal, made available to them by the plat-
forms. Central tools for this are monitoring, profiling,
targeting, and automatic optimization of target publics,
as well as having the timing, placement, and content
of influence campaigns based on consumer data and
real-time feedback (Nadler et al., 2018, p. 11). Many of
these strategic communication techniques are not new—
but the parasitic infrastructure “accelerates their reach,
hones their precision, and offers the means to evade
detection and penalties” (Nadler et al., 2018, p. 27). This
behaviour contrasts starkly with the platforms’ projected
self-image as champions of democratic values such as
neutrality and equality (Gillespie, 2010, p. 352). They
“largely deny responsibility for quality and accuracy of
the frames they disseminate and profit from, thereby giv-
ing rogue actors and ideological media power to distort
democracy” (Entman & Usher, 2018, p. 306).
4.2. Border Crossers
The current omnipresence of political-strategic actors
who position themselves mid-way between journalistic
mainstream discourse and extremist ideologies can only
be understood in the context of this co-parasitic synergy.
Here too, parasitic relations are at play, following the
paradoxical logic of the included third. From their inter-
mediary position, they are able to draw attention away
from the democratic discourse (relation of imbalance),
to mobilize and recruit; while at the same time invoking
the values of democratic discourse to claim a role as a
legitimate spokesperson, thus successively undermining
it (compromising relation).
They benefit from their “lack of ideological cohe-
sion, leadership and organization” (Fielitz & Marcks,
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2019, p. 7)—a blurry strategy in whose haze they can
cross back and forth between the mainstream discourse,
dominated by journalism, and the undemocratic out-
side. Accordingly, the ‘alt-right’ functions “as a rhetorical
bridge between white nationalism and the mainstream
public” (Hartzell, 2018, p. 24). As Hartzell (2018) explains,
this intermediary position allows right-wing actors to
either act in proximity to extremist ideology or to tem-
porarily distance themselves from it (e.g., after a terrorist
attack or right-wing riots), whatever ismost opportune in
a given situation (p. 24).
A parasite defines itself through its relation, which
also means that it cannot exist without a reference point
or host. Here, this need to act in relation to a host is
reflected in the euphemistic claim to represent an alter-
native (see also Holt, Ustad Figenschou, & Frischlich,
2019; for alternative media; Lees, 2018; for ’Alternative
for Germany,’ etc.). As Mészáros (2005) aptly puts it,
the strategy of these “alternative” groups consists in
“dismissing their adversary with an aprioristic negativ-
ity, remaining thus entirely dependent (i.e., intellectually
parasitic) on the arguments” (p. 257, emphasis in the
original) of the other side.
The ‘alternative’ aspect is thus primarily a pose
intended to legitimize the demand for visibility in the
democratic discourse. Right-wing actors consequently
present themselves as marginalized and discriminated
against by the mainstream. On social media, they
share stories about their ‘coming out’ as conservatives,
demanding “ideological diversity” in the mainstream
(Lewis, 2018, pp. 21–22). As Lewis (2018) points out, this
countercultural positioning is misleading: “These influ-
encers are adopting identity signals affiliated with previ-
ous countercultures, but the actual content of their argu-
ments seeks to reinforce dominant cultural racial and
gendered hierarchies” (p. 24).
It is therefore important to distinguish this mimicry
from the phenomenon of counterpublics (Fraser, 1990),
which can be classified as eufunctional parasites:
Although they do not always strive for symbiosis with the
dominant public, they share the basic values of the dom-
inant system. In contrast, Larson and McHendry (2019)
describe the alleged ‘alternative’ publics as “parasitic
publics…that feed off of oppressive conditions in the
public sphere by articulating with dominant discourses
to exploit dominant publics’ centripetal force” (p. 519).
Here, too, the compromising relation becomes evident:
The value of diversity, the inclusive centripetal force
of the democratic public sphere, is abused in order to
weaken it and thus cause a “societal norm shift” (Quandt,
2018, p. 43).
4.3. Parasitic Strategies
Contrary to the public image projected by its repre-
sentatives (as ‘alternative’ or ‘countercultural’), a par-
asitic element is not capable of creating something
original on its own—its innovative power consists solely
in putting existing things into new relations, channelling
away resources, and compromising values. In a network-
like information environment, the parasitic element is
the node that generates noise, thus stirring up ‘informa-
tion disorder’ (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017): It disidenti-
fies from the network by means of disinformation (false
information shared to cause harm) or malinformation
(genuine information shared to cause harm), thus forc-
ing other nodes to adapt (or at least irritating them).
One result, for instance, is the spread of misinformation
(spreading false information without malicious intent;
for the distinction between dis-, mal-, and misinforma-
tion, see Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017, p. 5).
The parasitic strategies stem from a variety of ori-
gins: Propaganda techniques (Lukito et al., 2020) work
synergistically with (online) marketing tools (Donovan
& Friedberg, 2019) and the insider knowledge of for-
mer journalists who now publish in partisan or alter-
native media (Phillips, 2018, p. 12). In parasitic chains,
the function of such ‘alternative’ journalists is to “laun-
der” (Donovan & Friedberg, 2019, pp. 16, 24), i.e., lend
legitimacy to slogans and narratives from social media
for populist actors to pick up and carry into the politi-
cal discourse.
Moreover, many parasitic techniques can be traced
back to the digital subculture of hacking or its sub-
forms “social hacking” (Kerr & Lee, 2019, p. 11) or
trolling (Phillips, 2018, p. 19). Like “a parasite, hacking
draws all its strength, strategies and tools from the sys-
tem on which and in which it operates” (Gunkel, 2001,
p. 6). At the same time, hacking does not introduce
anything new into the system: “It derives everything
from the host’s own protocols and procedures” (Gunkel,
2001, p. 6). According to Aradau et al. (2019), hacks
are thus “‘acts of digital parasitism,’ which create par-
asitic interferences by working beside or alongside dig-
ital technologies and assembling collectives of coders
and non-coders’’ (p. 2548). In this sense, hacking can be
understood as an overarching umbrella term for a wide
variety of parasitic practices in the digital world.
The news hackers’ strategies—called ‘exploits’ in IT
security lingo—target the weak spots of the journalis-
tic system or, to use the term from earlier, its predeter-
mined fault lines. It is often difficult to identify whether
such vulnerabilities are due to a lack of journalistic dili-
gence, a lack of competence, or digital naivety (“any-
thing x.0”; see Quandt, 2018, p. 38), or research prac-
tices that are prone to manipulation (Lukito et al., 2020;
McGregor, 2019)—or whether it is simply a lack of finan-
cial resources to defend against attack. News hacks aim
to manipulate editorial output, i.e., distort the tone, vol-
ume, and journalistic agenda (cf. media bias of Eberl,
Boomgaarden, & Wagner, 2017). However, as we have
seen, the attack vector does not end here—it also com-
promises values and exploits resources (Figure 1).
Thus, certain newshacks such as “keyword squatting”
(co-opting of keywords or accounts related to break-
ing news events, social movements, etc., to manipulate
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Squatting Agenda Credibility Diversity
Figure 1. Parasitic attack vector. Note: The starting point is identifying a predetermined fault line or vulnerability (e.g., lack
of resources, lack of competence etc.), in the case described here a lack of resources for verification of user-generated
content; then an exploit is applied (keyword squatting, leak forgery, strategic controversy etc.), manipulating an output
(volume, agenda or tonality of reporting) leading to resources being appropriated by the parasitic relations (e.g., infor-
mation, reputation, credibility, trust, authority, attention) and values being compromised (e.g., truthfulness, rationality,
representation, identity, agonism).
search traffic; Donovan & Friedberg, 2019, p. 37) or “evi-
dence collages” (compiling a blend of verified and unver-
ified information; Donovan & Friedberg, 2019, p. 26)
not only prey on weaknesses in journalistic practices
(e.g., lack of resources/competencies for verification,
homophilia, metrics orientation, partisan bias, false bal-
ance) and distortions of journalistic content (e.g., manip-
ulated saliences in the agenda). The relational-parasitic
angle highlights that beyond this, newshacks unfold their
real impact by also diminishing journalistic resources
(credibility, authority, attention, etc.) and damaging val-
ues (participation, diversity, truthfulness, etc.).
5. Conclusions
The antagonist of the journalistic systemdescribed in this
article is characterized by its paradoxical nature. It is the
‘the excluded third, included’ as described by Serres, the
parasite that is both part of the system and its antago-
nist. From the perspective of systems theory, the para-
site is a subsystem that threatens the integrity of the pri-
mary system.
The notion of the parasite is not new to the media
system—as we have retraced in this article, the differen-
tiation and integration of new media or logics that are
alien to the system (e.g., advertising) and the resulting
tensions can be described as parasitic relations. While
these tensions between the host and structurally sim-
ilar, eufunctional parasites can be resolved by way of
de-differentiation or inclusion, the presence of dysfunc-
tional parasites will successively weaken the system.
These parasites do not strive for inclusion but benefit
from their intermediate position, from which they drain
resources (relation of imbalance) and introduce noise
into the system to force a de-coding of system values
(compromising relation).
Thus, the parasite is not defined by characteristics
in the ontological sense, but mainly by certain relations
that describe its position, its behaviour towards the
host system. Due to these peculiarities—this contradic-
tion, this vagueness—it evades a classical bivalent logic
(Serres, 2007, p. 275). This may be one reason why the
paradoxical nature of the antagonist from within, the
‘uninvited dinner guest,’ has not been described as such
until now. The present work seeks to help close this gap
by adding a relational perspective to concepts such as
‘rogue actors’ (Entman & Usher, 2018) or ‘dark participa-
tion’ (Quandt, 2018).
Intermediary platforms were identified as a central
parasitic infrastructure in relation towhich strategic com-
municators behave co-parasitically in the sense of a
reflexive mechanism. Their practices follow the parasitic
logic of the hack, which draws all its “strength, strate-
gies and tools from the system” (Gunkel, 2001, p. 6).
The hacker is the digital manifestation of Serres’ parasite.
Accordingly, parasitic strategies can be described as news
hacks whose attack vectors target a system’s weak points
with the help of specific exploits. In doing so, they not
only change the system output, but also compromise its
constitutive values and exploit its vital resources.
This systematization of parasitic relations can serve
as a starting point for future analyses of antagonistic
actors and their practices. In this article, we were only
able to merely allude that from the perspective of the
journalistic system, various forms of strategic communi-
cation can be described as dysfunctional parasites, for
example populist rhetoric, demagogy, but also practices
of the alt-right. Follow-up case studies could be con-
ducted to further deepen these analyses. For a com-
prehensive view, research projects could use the attack
vector model, starting by questioning how journalists
behave in the digital space and which journalistic prac-
tices make them vulnerable to attack (analytical focus:
journalistic practice, as seen, for example, in McGregor,
2019; McGregor & Molyneux, 2020). The second step
would be to identify and describe the strategies news
hackers use to exploit these previously identified vul-
nerabilities, with a special focus on the technical infras-
tructure that makes the attack possible in the first place
(analytical focus: parasitic practice and infrastructure,
as seen, for example, in Donovan & Friedberg, 2019;
Phillips, 2018). At the output level, the question is how
content is manipulated, how parasitic strategies change
reporting (analytical focus: content, as seen, for example,
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in Lukito et al., 2020). These three levels and their asso-
ciated mechanisms are put into an analytical context
by their parasitic relations. For example, the relation of
imbalance could be operationalized as a loss of news
credibility, caused, for instance, by a lack of civility in
user comments (for example in Prochazka, Weber, &
Schweiger, 2018). At the same time, following the notion
of a one-sided exchange, the question would be which
actors benefit from this loss of resources; whether, for
example, the loss of credibility on the journalistic side
goes hand in hand with an increased willingness to
believe in alternative media (see ‘displacement effect,’
for example, in Omar & Ahrari, 2020).
Lastly, the relation of compromise allows us to
evaluate parasitic practices in the context of demo-
cratic values. News hacks are always based on liberal
system norms, degrees of freedom that can be lever-
aged with various intentions—and not always in accor-
dance with their original rationale. Parasites exploit this
ambivalence, thus compromising the value of the norm.
Measures taken against these harmful practices are
therefore often directed against the freedoms and values
themselves. This restrictive backlash can be observed
at various levels: Newsrooms shut down their comment
sections (Quandt, 2018, p. 37), platforms delete harm-
less content in response tomanipulation attempts (Acker,
2018, p. 4), journalists’ rights are restricted in favour
of secret services’ scope of authority (cf. the discussion
on the German ‘state Trojan’ and digital source protec-
tion in Meister, 2020). Measures like these are a con-
tradiction of the very system, which in turn can lead to
loss of credibility and legitimacy. Referring to Popper,
Fielitz and Marcks (2019) claim that this dilemma is an
inevitable consequence, a “reloaded ‘paradox of toler-
ance,’” “being intolerant of (liberal) structures produc-
ing intolerance” (p. 3). Destructive measures, however,
can only be legitimate as a last resort and must be crit-
ically questioned if presented as the only alternative.
Preference should be given to constructive measures
that identify vulnerabilities and apply ‘patches’ to elimi-
nate them (for example in journalistic training or in terms
of resources).
One limitation of these perspectives is the fact that
they are retrospective, meaning that they are only par-
tially suited for prevention. If research does not want to
be reduced to taking stock of damage done and recon-
structing events that have already happened, itmust find
ways to anticipate future developments. As a possible
solution to this communication science dilemma, Schäfer
and Wessler (2020) suggest considering sociotechnical
innovations “that are (potentially) relevant to public com-
munication” (p. 308), and to thus identify potential risks
at an early stage as “interventionist innovation research”
(p. 309). In addition, it could be useful to look into IT secu-
rity strategies (simulated attacks, honeypot scenarios,
sensitization) or organizational and design principles for
risk management, such as diversification, to see whether
they could be adapted for preventive research.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the four anonymous
reviewers as well as the Academic Editors for their valu-
able and constructive feedback on the manuscript.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Acker, A. (2018). Data craft: The manipulation of social
media metadata. New York, NY: Data & Society’s




Aradau, C., Blanke, T., & Greenway, G. (2019). Acts
of digital parasitism: Hacking, humanitarian
apps and platformisation. New Media & Soci-
ety, 21(11/12), 2548–2565. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1461444819852589
Bayer, J., Bitiukova, N., Bard, P., Szakács, J., Alemanno, A.,
& Uszkiewicz, E. (2019). Disinformation and propa-
ganda: Impact on the functioning of the rule of law
in the EU and its member states. Brussels: European
Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice
and Home Affairs (LIBE). Retrieved from https://
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/
2019/608864/IPOL_STU(2019)608864_EN.pdf
Bell, E. (2015, April 30). Google and Facebook are
our frenemy. Beware. Columbia Journalism Review.
https://www.cjr.org/analysis/google_facebook_
frenemy.php
Bell, E. J., & Owen, T. (2017). The platform press: How
Silicon Valley reengineered journalism. New York, NY:
Tow Center for Digital Journalism.
Caplan, R., & Boyd, D. (2018). Isomorphism through
algorithms: Institutional dependencies in the case of
Facebook. Big Data & Society, 5(1), 1–12. https://
doi.org/10.1177/2053951718757253
Carlson, M., & Lewis, S. C. (2019). Boundary work. In K.
Wahl-Jorgensen & T. Hanitzsch (Eds.), The handbook
of journalism studies (2nd ed., pp. 123–135). London:
Routledge.
Chadwick, A. (2017). The hybrid media system. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Couldry, N., & Yu, J. (2018). Deconstructing datafi-
cation’s brave new world. New Media & Soci-
ety, 20(12), 4473–4491. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1461444818775968
Davies, D. R. (1998). From ridicule to respect: Newspa-
pers’ reaction to television, 1948–1960. American
Journalism, 15(4), 17–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/
08821127.1998.10739140
Donovan, J., & Friedberg, B. (2019). Source hacking:
Media manipulation in practice. New York, NY: Data
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 88–98 95
& Society’s Media Manipulation Research Initiative.
Retrieved from https://datasociety.net/wp-content/
uploads/2019/09/Source-Hacking_Hi-res.pdf
Eberl, J.-M., Boomgaarden, H. G., & Wagner, M. (2017).
one bias fits all? Three types of media bias and
their effects on party preferences. Communica-
tion Research, 44(8), 1125–1148. https://doi.org/
10.1177/0093650215614364
Entman, R. M., & Usher, N. (2018). Framing in a frac-
tured democracy: Impacts of digital technology on
ideology, power and cascading network activation.
Journal of Communication, 68(2), 298–308. https://
doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqx019
Ernst, N., Esser, F., Blassnig, S., & Engesser, S. (2019).
Favorable opportunity structures for populist com-
munication: Comparing different types of politicians
and issues in social media, television and the press.
The International Journal of Press/Politics, 24(2),
165–188. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161218819
430
Fielitz, M., & Marcks, H. (2019). Digital fascism: Chal-
lenges for the open society in times of social
media. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Center for Right-Wing
Studies. Retrieved from https://escholarship.org/uc/
item/87w5c5gp
Fournier, T. (2019). From rhetoric to action, a consti-
tutional analysis of populism. German Law Journal,
20(3), 362–381. https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2019.22
Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the public sphere: A contri-
bution to the critique of actually existing democracy.
Social Text, 25. https://doi.org/10.2307/466240
George, C. (2016). Hate spin: The manufacture of reli-
gious offense and its threat to democracy. Cam-
bridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Gillespie, T. (2010). The politics of ‘platforms.’ New
Media & Society, 12(3), 347–364. https://doi.org/
10.1177/1461444809342738
Gunkel, D. J. (2001). Hacking cyberspace. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Hahl, O., Kim, M., & Zuckerman Sivan, E. W. (2018).
The authentic appeal of the lying demagogue: Pro-
claiming the deeper truth about political illegitimacy.
American Sociological Review, 83(1), 1–33. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0003122417749632
Haller, A., & Holt, K. (2018). Paradoxical populism: How
PEGIDA relates to mainstream and alternative media.
Information, Communication & Society. https://doi.
org/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1449882
Hartzell, S. L. (2018). Alt-white: Conceptualizing the “alt-
right” as a rhetorical bridge between white national-
ism andmainstream public discourse. Journal of Con-
temporary Rhetoric, 8(1/2), 6–25.
Helberger, N., Kleinen-von Königslöw, K., & van der Noll,
R. (2015). Regulating the new information interme-
diaries as gatekeepers of information diversity. Info,
17(6), 50–71. https://doi.org/10.1108/info-05-2015-
0034
Holt, K., Ustad Figenschou, T., & Frischlich, L. (2019).
Key dimensions of alternative news media. Digital
Journalism, 7(7), 860–869. https://doi.org/10.1080/
21670811.2019.1625715
Kerr, E., & Lee, C. A. L. (2019). Trolls maintained: Bait-
ing technological infrastructures of informational jus-
tice. Information, Communication & Society, 1–18.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2019.1623903
Kielbowicz, R. B. (2015). Regulating timeliness: Technolo-
gies, laws, and the news, 1840–1970. Journalism &
Communication Monographs, 17(1), 5–83. https://
doi.org/10.1177/1077699014566380
Larson, K. R., & McHendry, G. F. (2019). Parasitic publics.
Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 49(5), 517–541. https://
doi.org/10.1080/02773945.2019.1671986
Leanza, M. (2014). Grenzrauschen: Zur Figur des Para-
siten in der Systemtheorie [Border noise: On the fig-
ure of the parasite in systems theory]. BEHEMOTH: A
Journal on Civilisation, Das Andere der Ordnung, 28.
https://doi.org/10.6094/BEHEMOTH.2014.7.1.771
Lees, C. (2018). The ‘Alternative for Germany’: The
rise of right-wing populism at the heart of Europe.
Politics, 38(3), 295–310. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0263395718777718
Lewis, R. (2018). Alternative influence: Broadcasting the
reactionary right on YouTube. New York, NY: Data
& Society’s Media Manipulation Research Initiative.
https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/
09/DS_Alternative_Influence.pdf
Luhmann, N. (1970). Reflexive Mechanismen [Reflex-
ive mechanisms]. In N. Luhmann (Ed.), Soziologis-
che Aufklärung 1: Aufsätze zur Theorie sozialer Sys-
teme [Sociological education 1: Essays on the the-
ory of social systems] (pp. 92–112). Wiesbaden:
VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/
10.1007/978-3-322-96984-2_5
Luhmann, N. (2008). Schriften zu Kunst und Literatur
[Texts on art and literature]. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
Lukito, J., Suk, J., Zhang, Y., Doroshenko, L., Kim,
S. J., Su, M.-H., Xia, Y., Freelon, D., & Wells, C.
(2020). The wolves in sheep’s clothing: How Rus-
sia’s Internet research agency tweets appeared in
U.S. news as vox populi. The International Jour-
nal of Press/Politics, 25(2), 196–216. https://doi.org/
10.1177/1940161219895215
McAllister, M. P. (1996). The commercialization of Ameri-
can culture: Newadvertising, control, and democracy.
London: Sage.
McGregor, S. C. (2019). Social media as public opinion:
How journalists use social media to represent pub-
lic opinion. Journalism, 20(8), 1070–1086. https://
doi.org/10.1177/1464884919845458
McGregor, S. C., & Molyneux, L. (2020). Twitter’s influ-
ence on news judgment: An experiment among jour-
nalists. Journalism, 21(5), 597–613. https://doi.org/
10.1177/1464884918802975
Meister, A. (2020, June 18). Staatstrojaner für Geheim-
dienste: “Tritt die Regelung in Kraft, werden wir
dagegen klagen” [State Trojan for intelligence ser-
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 88–98 96
vices: “If the regulation is enacted, wewill appeal it”].
Netzpolitik. Retrieved from https://netzpolitik.org/
2020/staatstrojaner-fuer-geheimdienste-tritt-die-
regelung-in-kraft-werden-wir-dagegen-klagen
Mejias, U. A. (2010). The limits of networks as mod-
els for organizing the social. New Media & Society,
12(4), 603–617. https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448
09341392
Mészáros, I. (2005). The power of ideology. London: Zed
Books.
Mouffe, C. (2000). The democratic paradox. London:
Verso.
Nadler, A., Crain, M., & Donovan, J. (2018). Weaponiz-
ing the digital influence machine: The political
perils of online ad tech. New York, NY: Data
& Society’s Media Manipulation research initia-
tive. Retrieved from https://datasociety.net/library/
weaponizing-the-digital-influence-machine
Newman, N., Fletcher, R., Schulz, A., Andı, S., &Nielsen, R.
K. (2020). Reuters Institute digital news report 2020.
Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism.
Nieborg, D. B., & Poell, T. (2018). The platformiza-
tion of cultural production: Theorizing the con-
tingent cultural commodity. New Media & Soci-
ety, 20(11), 4275–4292. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1461444818769694
Omar, B., & Ahrari, S. (2020). Mainstream and non-
mainstream media in Malaysia: Does lack of cred-
ibility lead to displacement? Newspaper Research
Journal, 41(2), 127–145. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0739532920919825
Patnode, R. (2011). Friend, foe, or freeloader? Coop-
eration and competition between newspapers
and radio in the early 1920s. American Jour-
nalism, 28(1), 75–95. https://doi.org/10.1080/
08821127.2011.10678182
Phillips, W. (2018). The oxygen of amplification: Bet-
ter practices for reporting on extremists, antago-
nists, and manipulators. New York, NY: Data &




Prochazka, F., Weber, P., & Schweiger, W. (2018).
Effects of civility and reasoning in user comments
on perceived journalistic quality. Journalism
Studies, 19(1), 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/
1461670X.2016.1161497
Quandt, T. (2018). Dark participation. Media and Com-
munication, 6(4), 36–48. https://doi.org/10.17645/
mac.v6i4.1519
Schäfer, M. S., & Wessler, H. (2020). Öffentliche Kom-
munikation in Zeiten künstlicher Intelligenz: Warum
und wie die Kommunikationswissenschaft Licht in
die Black Box soziotechnischer Innovationen bringen
sollte [Public communication in times of artificial
intelligence: Why and how communication science
should crack open the black box of sociotechnical
innovations]. Publizistik, 65(3), 307–331. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11616-020-00592-6
Schauster, E. E., Ferrucci, P., & Neill, M. S. (2016). Native
advertising is the new journalism: How deception
affects social responsibility. American Behavioral Sci-
entist, 60(12), 1408–1424. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0002764216660135
Schmitt, M. (2011). Parasitäre Strukturbildung: Ein-
sichten aus System—und Netzwerktheorie in die
Figur des Parasiten [Parasitic structure formation:
Insights from system and network theory into the
figure of the parasite]. In B. P. Priddat & M. Schmid
(Eds.), Korruption als Ordnung zweiter Art [Corrup-
tion as an order of the second kind] (pp. 43–59).
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-93011-4_3
Schneider, W. L. (2014). Parasiten sozialer Systeme [Para-
sites of social systems]. In B. Heintz & H. Tyrell (Eds.),
Interaktion—Organisation—Gesellschaft revisited
[Interaction—Organization—Society revisited] (pp.
86–108). Berlin: De Gruyter.
Serres, M. (2007). The parasite. Minneapolis, MN: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press.
Siapera, E. (2013). Platform infomediation and journal-
ism. Culture Machine, 14, 1–28.
Strömbäck, J. (2005). In search of a standard: Four mod-
els of democracy and their normative implications
for journalism. Journalism Studies, 6(3), 331–345.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14616700500131950
Urbinati, N. (2014).Democracy disfigured: Opinion, truth,
and the people. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Van Dijck, J. (2014). Datafication, dataism and dataveil-
lance: Big data between scientific paradigm and
ideology. Surveillance & Society, 12(2), 197–208.
https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i2.4776
Wang, Q. (2020). Differentiation and de-differentiation:
The evolving power dynamics between news indus-
try and tech industry. Journalism & Mass Commu-
nication Quarterly, 97(2), 509–527. https://doi.org/
10.1177/1077699020916809
Wardle, C., & Derakhshan, H. (2017). Information dis-
order: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for
research and policy making (Report No. 27). Stras-
bourg: Council of Europe.
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 88–98 97
About the Authors
Gerret von Nordheim is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the field of communication science at the
University of Hamburg. His research focuses on intermedia effects in the hybrid media system, espe-
cially between journalism, social media, and populist actors. He is specialized in the field of computa-
tional methods.
Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw is a Professor for Journalism and Communication Studies, with a
focus on Digital Communication and Sustainability at the Universität Hamburg. Her research focuses
on the impact of digitalisation and technological innovations on political communication and, in par-
ticular, the role of social network platforms and their use by citizens and political actors.
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 88–98 98
